Game Theory In International Environmental Agreements

In recent years, the number of publications analyzing the emergence and stability of international environmental agreements (IAAs) with the game theory method has increased sharply. This paper reports on some recent results that are supposed to demonstrate the usefulness, but also the limitation of game theory for the analysis of IEAs. It limits attention to the class of uncooperative membership models and focuses on the relationship between different designs and the success of IEAs. The results of the climate change problem are illustrated by the empirical coalition stability model (STACO) developed by Dellink et al. (2004). Subsequently, certain characteristics of the actual contractual form, which are not taken into account in this model, are discussed with reference to the literature and their importance for future research will be highlighted. Theoretical research on the development of international environmental agreements: knowledge, critical commentaries and future challenges. / Finus, Mr. Enter your email address below and we will send you the instructions to reset your IP address has been automatically blocked due to excessive use of the website. To help remove the IP lock, please contact [email protected] and provide your IP address…. JO – International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics If the address matches an existing account, you will receive an email with instructions on how to reset your password.

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