Like Srivastava, many journalists who were in the Prime Minister`s delegation wrote detailed reports about the declaration of the unfortunate deaths of Tashkent and Shastrri. They all felt that Shastri`s death was natural and that there was no doubt about a bad game. The best way to summarize it is L.P. Singh, who was then Home Minister and was part of the Prime Minister`s entourage in Tashkent: « The circumstances of Shastri`s death in Tashkent were explained in a statement to Parliament more than 25 years ago and the report of the medical group, including Shastris` Indian doctor, Dr. Chugh, was put on the table of the house. After that, no one should have doubted that Shastri had died of a sudden and severe heart attack. But some in India unnecessarily seek conspiracy theories to explain important events, including the death of a national leader. But this is India where people get carried away, whether it`s rumors or lies. Finally, it`s Satyamev Jayate. The deal was criticized in India for not containing a non-war pact or renunciation of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. After the signing of the agreement, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died mysteriously in Tashkent.  Shastri`s sudden death led to stubborn conspiracy theories that he was poisoned.
 The Indian government refused to downgrade a report on his death claiming it could damage foreign relations, cause disruption in the country and a breach of parliamentary privileges.  On the 10th The Tashkent Declaration between India and Pakistan was signed on January 1, 1966 after the unsuccessful war of 1965. This article contains details about the historical statement in the context of the IAS audit. On the evening of January 9, it seemed that the talks were failing, as both sides were not ready to compromise on their respective stands. Morning newspapers in India, on January 10 – brought dispatches from Indian correspondents in the Prime Minister`s entourage in Tashkent – Indian Malhotra (Statesman), Krishan Bhatta (Hindustan Times), Dev Murarka (Indian Express), Kuldip Nayyar (UNI) and G.K. Reddy (Times of India). They all reported a virtual failure of conversations. While the Indian Malhotra said: « Mr. Kossygin was desperately trying to save the conversations from total failure and collapse. Bhatia said: « If it is not surprising, the Tashkent conference is expected to end tomorrow with an unequivocal disagreement between Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. » IX The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the parties will maintain meetings, both at the highest level and at others, on issues of direct concern to both countries. Both sides recognized the need to set up joint Indo-Pakistani forums that will report to their governments to decide on the next steps to be taken. Discussions began on January 3, 1966 in Tashkent, with Kossygin Shastri and Ayub first meeting separately before subsequent summits. Earlier, shortly after the ceasefire, the Security Council had adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all armed personnel from positions they held before 5 August 1965.
Kossygin stressed in the implementation of this resolution, in which the USSR participated with other powers. When Indian Prime Minister Kossygin said that India would in no way abandon the Haji Pir passport, as it was of great strategic importance and had been won « after a heavy casualty of our brave military personnel », Kossygin replied that if India did not withdraw from Haji Pir (and Tithwal), Pakistan would not withdraw from Chhamb and other Indian territories occupied by Pakistan and there would be no All right. Like Ayub Khan, who insisted that Kashmir be on the agenda and refuse to leave Chhamb, the Soviet prime minister said that the failure of the talks would not only lead to Pakistan`s loss of prestige in the world, but also to the resumption of war that his country could not afford. . . .